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RECENT CASE NOTES
attorney,2 0 the manner in which the mention of insurance came out2 1 and the
action of the judge in attempting to cure the prejudice, 2 2 all are important in
determining whether or not the prejudice which is assumed to arise on the men-
tion of insurance was removed.
In the principal case, regardless of whether or not we agree with the
holding "that the facts and circumstances as presented by the. record in this
case do not warrant its reversal," we have no quarrel with the court's con-
ception and statement of the law. L. W
CRIMINAL LAW-EMBEZZLEMENT-INTENT To DEFRAUv.-Defendant was
cashier in charge of trust affairs for a bank. The bank was the guardian
of Mary A. Yoder. Defendant bought some bonds for $430.33 and sold them
to the ward's estate for $2,000.00. Defendant was indicted under Sec. 10-
1704 Burns Indiana Statutes, Annotated (1933) for embezzling $1,569.67 of the
ward's funds and convicted. Defendant appeals. Held, that such a sale by
a guardian to his ward is criminal even if the guardian believed that he was
within his rights in doing so.1
The relation of guardian and ward is fiduciary,2 and a fiduciary is
required to exercise absolute good faith.3 Because of this relation the transac-
tions between guardian and ward are watched with jealous care. 4 The
guardian when acting officially must act solely for his beneficiary, and the law
will look with disfavor on transactions between a guardian and his ward. 5
So where a ward subsequently attacks a transaction between guardian and
ward, the law will presume fraud, on the grounds of public policy, and
leave it to the defendant to rebut the presumption.0 So where a guardian
acquires an interest adverse to that of his ward he may be removed,7 nor
will he be allowed to retain any advantage derived from this adverse
interest.8
In the instant case we have a prosecution for embezzlement. Embezzlement
is the fraudulent appropriation or conversion of the goods of another by one
who is rightfully in possession of them.0 The embezzlement statutes were
primarily intended to reach and punish the fraudulent conversion of property
which could not be punished as larceny because of the absence of a trespass
and their object must be borne in mind in construing them.10 There can be
no embezzlement under the statutes where there is no intent to defraud,11
20 Scott v. Vaugh (1934), - Kan. -, 37 P 2nd 1012.
21 Smith v. Sabin (1934), - Cal. App. -, 31 P 2nd 230.
22 Burns v. Getty (1933), - Idaho -, 24, P 2nd 31.
1 Yoder v. State (1935), 194 N. E. 645 (Ind).
2 Bogert, Trusts (1921), 34.
8 Flynn v. Colbert (1925), 251 Mass. 489, 146 N. E. 784.
4 Euler v. Euler (1913), 55 Ind. App. 547, 102 N. E. 856.
5 National Surety Co. v. State (1913), 181 Ind. 54, 103 N. E. 108.
6 National Surety Co. v. State (1913), 181 Ind. 54, 103 N. E. 108.
7 Sec. 2233, California Civil Code (1931).8 Taylor v. Calvert (1893), 138 Ind. 67, 37 N. E. 534.
O State v. Ensley (1909), 177 Ind. 501, 97 N. E. 113, Axtell v. State (1911),
173 Ind. 713, 91 N. E. 354.
10 Commonwealth v. Hays (1859), 80 Mass. 64.
11 Ridge v. State (1923), 192 Ind. 639, 137 N. E. 759.
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and the intent must be present at the time of the taking.' 2 If there were direct
evidence of intent in this case the court's task would have been simple, but
the fact that the defendant maintained his honest belief that he had a right
to sell these stocks to himself as guardian seems to have resulted in the
court invoking the doctrine that wrongful intent can be inferred from the
wrongful act if the act is one prohibited by statute, provided it is shown that
the defendant intended to do the act. That an act prohibited by statute can
be made the basis for a conviction, in the absence of a showing of any intent
other than to do the prohibited act, has been held.13 But these were cases
of acts mala prohibita, acts which are made offenses by positive laws, usually
passed in the exercise of the police power. Criminal or fraudulent intent is
not an essential element of such crimes. 1 4 But even in those crimes where a
fraudulent intent is necessary it is usually proved by circumstantial evidence,' 5
and this court has gone even further and upheld a presumption of wrongful
intent from the general conduct of the defendant. 1 6 That this presumption
applies in cases of embezzlement has also been held both in Indiana 17 and in
other jurisdictions.18 It would seem that the application of the presumption
in the case of a guardian accused of embezzlement is supported by the same
reasons that have led to its use in other types of embezzlement; that is, that
the state of the accused's mind, although an existing fact,19 can not be defi-
nitely proved or proved beyond a reasonable doubt as required by criminal
law if he does not wish to divulge it.
The statute under which the defendant was prosecuted sets out specific
acts under none of which the transaction here could be appropriately placed
and then says--"or appropriates with intent to defraud."20 The question
of fraudulent appropriation is simple where there has been an actual physical
taking, but it need not be that obvious; it may be constructive. 21 The Illinois
Court has held that whether there has been sufficient conversion to make out
the crime of embezzlement is always dependent upon the attendant circum-
stances and relations of the parties. 2 2  So it has been held that a sale which
under the circumstances' looks like a device for the sole purpose of effecting a
fraud is fraudulent appropriation of the proceeds. 2 3 In Agar v. State the
12 Ridge v. State (1923), 192 Ind. 639, 137 N. E. 759.
13 Armour Packing Co. v. United States (1907), 153 Fed. 1, Commonwealth
v. Mixer (1910), 207 Mass. 141, 93 N. E. 249; Greene v. Fankhouser (1910),
121 N. Y. S. 1004, State v. Dorman (1897), 9 S. D. 528, 70 N. W 848.
14 Armour Packing Co. v. United States (1907), 153 Fed. 1.
15People v. Connors (1912), 253 I1. 266, 97 N. E. 648. "The intent or
purpose exists only in the mind of the accused, and, like malice, or any
feeling, emotion, or mental status, is manifested by external circumstances
capable of proof."
16 Fletcher v. State (1874), 49 Ind. 126, Marmont v. State (1874), 48
Ind. 32.
17 Price v. State (1929), 201 Ind. 461, 168 N. E. 579.
18 United States v. Breese (1904), 131 Fed. 915, Marcus v. Maryland
Fidelity Co. (1914), 149 N. Y. S. 1020; People v. Flynn (1909), 118 N. Y.
S. 533.
1O Harper, Law of Tort (1933), 452.
20 Sec. 10-1704 Burns Indiana Statutes, Annotated (1933).
21 State v. Ensley (1909), 177 Ind. 483, 97 N. E. 113.
2 2 People v. Ehle (1916), 273 Ill. 424, 112 N. E. 970. -
2 8 Parker v. Nickerson (1873), 112 Mass. 195.
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court says, "Therefore, when an agent or employee has authority to sell or
otherwise dispose of property and does sell or otherwise dispose of it, not for
the purpose authorized but with fraudulent intent to appropriate it or its
proceeds to his own use, he is guilty of embezzling the property itself as much
as if he had no authority to sell or otherwise dispose of it, for the sale or
disposition of the property with said fraudulent intent is a conversion." 2 4
The importance of this decision lies in the fact that, so far as this writer has
been able to learn, this is the first instance in which a fraudulent appropria-
tion in the civil sense has been held sufficient for fraudulent appropriation in
the criminal sense. This takes on added significance when we remember that
this was a case where fraudulent criminal intent was not directly proved but
had to be inferred from the act. It seems that the court has taken another
step in the direction of merging criminal prosecutions under express statutory
definitions with common law doctrines imposing civil liability. The high
degree of care and good faith in managing trust estates has thus taken on a
wider import by its application to criminal liability.2 5  D. C.
DAMAGES-LIQUIDATED DAMAGES-PENALTY.-Plaintiff sued defendant to
recover liquidated damages for defendant buyer's breach of a contract to
purchase certain brands of flour manufactured by plaintiff seller, The con-
tract provided for liquidated damages in case of buyer's failure to furnish
shipping instructions, on the basis of % cent per day per barrel of flour from
date of sale to date of termination as expense of carrying, plus twenty cents
per barrel as cost of selling, plus or minus the amount or the difference
between the market value at date of sale and the market value at date of
termination of the amount of wheat necessary to manufacture the number of
barrels of flour undelivered. Defendant contends that the contract provision
for liquidated damages is invalid as the measure of damages in Indiana for
breach of contract for sale of goods is the difference between the contract price
and the market price at the date of breach. Held, the contract provisions for
liquidated damages were valid and the damages assessed were not excessive. 1
Damages, as that term is used in the law of contracts, is intended com-
pensation for a breach, measured in the terms of the contract. Damages are
awarded by a jury, by the court in applying the rules of damages, or by the
parties to a contract when they liquidate the damages by attempting in
advance to estimate in good faith the actual damage which will probably
flow from the breach.
Liquidated damages have not been permitted by the courts when they
had the characteristics of a penalty rather than a bona-fide attempt by the
parties to estimate their probable injury. As a general rule the intent of the
parties is controlling as to whether a provision is for liquidated damages
or is a penalty,2 but the courts are not bound by the name given to the
agreement by the parties in determining the character of the sum payable on
24 (1911), 176 Ind. 234, 247, 94- N. E. 819, 824.
25 26 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 289.
1 Letellier et al. v. Abilene Flour Mills Co. (1935), 198 N. E. 111.
2 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1907), 205 U. S. 105.
